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Providing Clarity for Standard of Conduct for 
Directors Within Benefit Corporations: Requiring 
Priority of a Specific Public Benefit 
Roxanne Thorelli* 
Since its inception, Patagonia—one of the leading outdoor 
outfitters in the United States—has been committed to reduc-
ing its environmental impact.1 By researching and developing 
environmentally friendly materials and methods, utilizing facil-
ity resources to the fullest, and directing a portion of its profits 
to social and environmental causes, Patagonia has been heavily 
focused on sustainability issues for more than three decades.2 
Indeed, even its mission statement reflects this strong com-
mitment: “Build the best product, cause no unnecessary harm, 
[and] use business to inspire and implement solutions to the 
environmental crisis.”3 
Until 2012, Patagonia was a traditional for-profit corpora-
tion with a strong social mission. That year, however, a new 
legislative assembly bill was enacted to create the benefit cor-
poration legal entity in California.4 Recognizing that the benefit 
corporation entity provided the legal framework necessary for it 
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2014, 
University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire. I am very grateful to Professor Brett 
McDonnell who provided inspiration and guidance for this Note and much in-
sight about benefit corporations. A heartfelt thank you to my mother, Dr. Ire-
ne M. Thorelli, for spending countless hours reviewing and providing revision 
suggestions. Last, thank you to all the Minnesota Law Review editors and staff 
members who provided feedback throughout the writing and editing process, 
particularly to Steve Owen. Copyright © 2017 by Roxanne Thorelli. 
 1. Company History, PATAGONIA, http://www.patagonia.com/company 
-history.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2017). 
 2. Patagonia uses primarily recycled and reclaimed materials to create 
products, consumes solar power for energy, and improves existing buildings 
instead of constructing new facilities. Resource Use, PATAGONIA, http://www 
.patagonia.com/resource-use.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2017). 
 3. Patagonia’s Mission Statement, PATAGONIA, http://www.patagonia 
.com/company-info.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2017). 
 4. Assemb. 361, 2011–12 Cal. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011). 
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to remain true to its social goals,5 Patagonia quickly took ad-
vantage of this new option. Today, Patagonia is likely one of the 
most well-known benefit corporations in the United States.6 
Benefit corporations similar to Patagonia are for-profit and 
have three distinguishing features. First, the required corpo-
rate purpose is to create a material positive impact on society 
and the environment.7 Second, expanded director duties require 
consideration of other non-shareholder interests as well as the 
financial interest of shareholders when making corporate deci-
sions.8 Third, it is required to annually report the overall im-
pact of the social and environmental performance using a cred-
ible, transparent, and independent third-party standard.9 Thus, 
while a traditional for-profit corporation cannot fully pursue 
social purposes because of duties owed to shareholders, and 
while non-profit corporations cannot raise profits, benefit cor-
porations can do both.10 Benefit corporation directors must con-
sider people, the planet, and profit—referred to as the “triple 
bottom line”11—as opposed to profit alone, for traditional for-
profit corporations,12 or just people and the planet, for non-
profit corporations.13 
 
 5. See B-Lab, PATAGONIA, http://www.patagonia.com/b-lab.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 6, 2017) (“Benefit corporation legislation creates the legal framework 
to enable mission-driven companies like Patagonia to stay mission-driven 
through succession, capital raises, and even changes in ownership, by institu-
tionalizing the values, culture, processes, and high standards put in place by 
founding entrepreneurs.”). 
 6. J. Haskell Murray, Defending Patagonia: Mergers and Acquisitions 
with Benefit Corporations, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 485, 486–87 (2013). 
 7. BILL CLARK, DRINKER, BIDDLE, & REATH LLP, MODEL BENEFIT COR-
PORATION LEGISLATION § 102 (2016), http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/how 
-pass-benefit-corporation-legislation [hereinafter MODEL ACT] (download mod-
el legislation). 
 8. Id. § 301(a). 
 9. Id. § 401. 
 10. For further discussion about the different director duties between tra-
ditional for-profit, non-profit, and benefit corporations, see infra Part I.B. 
 11. See Timothy F. Slaper & Tanya J. Hall, The Triple Bottom Line: What 
Is It and How Does It Work?, IND. BUS. REV. (Spring 2011), http://www.ibrc 
.indiana.edu/ibr/2011/spring/pdfs/spring2011.pdf (defining the “triple bottom 
line”). 
 12. Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and 
Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 288 (2013) (describing that tradi-
tional for-profit company benefits include making profits, although not exclu-
sively). 
 13. Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit Cor-
porate Governance—A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary 
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Although Patagonia may be the biggest and most well-
known company to shift to the benefit corporation model, it is 
certainly not the only one.14 Other companies find this new 
model attractive in order to authenticate their status as a so-
cially responsible entity that is accountable for its actions to 
provide a materially positive impact on society and the envi-
ronment. Benefit corporations have advantages for all company 
shareholders and stakeholders, from reduced director liability 
to expanded stockholder rights to an advantage in attracting 
talent and increased access to private investment capital.15 
However, while benefit corporations may be growing in 
popularity, they do not come without a set of risks and compli-
cations, specifically relating to the expanded director duties to 
consider the shareholder and non-shareholder interests when 
making corporate decisions.16 As many scholars have rightly 
recognized, current benefit corporation legislation lacks guid-
ance for director duties regarding how to make decisions based 
on the divided loyalties to shareholders and stakeholders.17 For 
 
Duties, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 347, 350–51 (2012) (distinguishing non-profit cor-
porations and the director duties owed to stakeholders). 
 14. There are over 3700 registered benefit corporations in the United 
States, with almost 500 in Delaware and 200 in California. N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, 
NEW YORK BENEFIT CORPORATIONS AT FIVE YEARS OLD: A LOOK BACK AND A 
PEEK INTO THE FUTURE; B LAB DESCRIPTION OF BENEFIT CORPORATIONS, 
Westlaw 20160929P NYCBAR 19 (Sept. 19, 2016). Other known benefit corpo-
rations include: B Corp, PLUM ORGANICS, http://www.plumorganics.com/ 
benefit-corp (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (delivering nourishing, organic food to 
young children as part of the greater societal purpose led Plum Organics, a 
subsidiary of Campbell Soup Company, to reincorporate as a benefit corpora-
tion in 2013); Kickstarter Is a Benefit Corporation, KICKSTARTER, https://www 
.kickstarter.com/charter?ref=hello (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (defining 
Kickstarter as focused on the mission to help bring creative projects to life in-
stead of focusing on profits, so the company reincorporated as a benefit corpo-
ration in 2015); Mission, LAUREATE EDUC., INC., http://www.laureate 
.net/AboutLaureate/Mission (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (stating that Laureate 
Education is the largest company to become a public benefit corporation with 
over one million students at over seventy institutions in twenty-five coun-
tries); Our Business, METHOD, http://methodhome.com/beyond-the-bottle/our 
-business (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (describing how Method Products reincor-
porated as a benefit corporation in 2013 to formally focus on sustainability). 
 15. Why Is Benefit Corp Right for Me?, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp 
.net/businesses/why-become-benefit-corp (last visited Mar. 6, 2017). 
 16. See MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(a). 
 17. Steven Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional 
Governance Mechanisms Can Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7 
NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 170, 190 (2012) (explaining how directors need stricter 
duty guidelines to be able to frame and defend their decisions); See e.g., J. 
Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit Cor-
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example, neither benefit corporation statutes nor state case law 
address questions such as what weight directors should assign 
to shareholder and non-shareholder interests and which inter-
ests fall within the protected stakeholder categories that direc-
tors must consider. 
Regrettably, existing legal scholarship has failed to ad-
dress this problem in a systematic way. This lack of guidance 
for directors needs to be remedied, as benefit corporations are 
becoming more prevalent and directors need clarity for their 
responsibilities. Due to the requirement for pursuing a public 
benefit, directors of benefit corporations must understand their 
duties so they can fulfill their obligations to company stake-
holders and promote the greater good.18 Besides the directors 
themselves, determining the director standard of conduct con-
cerns legal practitioners who protect director-clients and social 
activists who want benefit corporations to be accountable for 
fulfilling their social responsibilities.19 With novel fiduciary du-
ties for directors and no current case law for breach of benefit 
corporation fiduciary duty or benefit corporation governance, it 
is important to clarify director duty and provide guidance;20 
otherwise, the new corporate entity may ultimately prove un-
successful.21 
 
poration Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345, 354–55 (2014); Antony Page, New 
Corporate Forms and Green Business, 37 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
347, 364 (2013).  
 18. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 
Days out: Who’s Opting in?, 14 U. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 275–76 (2014) (stating 
that research must continue to determine how director actions of balancing 
stakeholder interests will be interpreted). Also, because corporations “exist to 
create value,” it is important that directors have a clear sense of how they are 
required to run a corporation and which values they are permitted to foster. 
Joseph R. Shealy, The Corporate Identity Theory Dilemma: North Carolina 
and the Need for Constructionist Corporate Law Reform, 94 N.C. L. REV. 686, 
711 (2016). 
 19. Deborah J. Walker, Comment, Please Welcome the Minnesota Public 
Benefit Corporation, 11 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 151, 177 (2013). 
 20. Christopher Lacovara, Strange Creatures: A Hybrid Approach to Fidu-
ciary Duty in Benefit Corporations, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 815, 879–80 
(2011). 
 21. Studies show that when companies “participate in stakeholder-
enhancing and socially responsible activities[, they] have to face negative eco-
nomic consequences and often find themselves being pushed out of business.” 
SHUANGGE WEN, SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LE-
GAL ASPECTS, PRACTICES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 88 n.45 (2013). But cf. id. 
at 176 (contending that benefit corporations will gain instrumental value 
through positive brand image and corporate reputation by creating socially 
responsible attributes). 
  
2017] PROVIDING CLARITY 1753 
 
This Note seeks to overcome the gap in the legal literature 
by providing a novel solution that will guide benefit corporation 
directors as they navigate this complicated terrain. Part I in-
troduces the features of the benefit corporation as a new legal 
entity within social enterprises as well as its history. It also de-
scribes the provisions of director duty and liability within the 
Model Benefit Corporation Act (Model Act) in comparison to di-
rector duty and liability of for-profit and non-profit corpora-
tions. Part II explores and analyzes five important shortcom-
ings of the current director duty provisions within several state 
benefit corporation statutes, ultimately arguing that the specif-
ic public benefit should be required and prioritized. Part III 
draws from the strengths of the Model Act and various state 
benefit corporation statutes to formulate statutory text that 
will provide increased guidance for directors in performing 
their duties. This Note proposes an ideal statute provision by 
requiring a specific public benefit, prioritizing the required spe-
cific public benefit purpose within director considerations, and 
including an opt-in for a general public benefit purpose to pro-
vide clarity regarding director duties in benefit corporations. 
I.  GENERAL STRUCTURE OF BENEFIT CORPORATIONS 
AND DIRECTOR DUTIES   
Traditional for-profit corporations are intended to pursue 
the pecuniary interests of their shareholders.22 These corpora-
tions may engage in socially beneficial activities, but the activi-
ties must be measured against an overall profit motive.23 By 
contrast, non-profit corporations pursue socially beneficial ends 
generally without a view towards a profit motive for its mem-
bers.24 The important difference is that non-profit corporations 
do not have shareholders who receive distributions.25 Between 
the pursuits of traditional for-profit and non-profit corporations 
is the benefit corporation.26 Benefit corporations consider the 
 
 22. Regina Robson, A New Look at Benefit Corporations: Game Theory 
and Game Changer, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 501, 513 (2015) (stating how traditional 
corporations are required to maximize shareholder wealth). 
 23. J. William Callison, Benefit Corporations, Innovation, and Statutory 
Design, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 143, 144 (2014). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Thomas H. Boyd, Note, A Call To Reform the Duties of Directors Un-
der State Not-For-Profit Corporation Statutes, 72 IOWA L. REV. 725, 729 (1987). 
 26. See Laura A. Farley, Note, Knowledge Is Power: How Implementing 
Affirmative Disclosures Under the JOBS Act Could Promote and Protect Bene-
fit Corporations and Their Investors, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1507, 1508 (2015). 
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social good. They are also for-profit, having shareholders who 
obtain financial benefit from dividends.27 However, the share-
holders recognize that producing social good might reduce prof-
itability.28 
This Part will introduce the benefit corporation and direc-
tor duties in general. Section A will discuss the features of the 
benefit corporation as a new legal entity within social enter-
prises, including the history of its creation through the B Lab 
Organization and constituency statutes, as well as its main 
three components: purpose, accountability, and transparency. 
Section B will describe director duties and liability within a 
traditional for-profit corporation, a non-profit corporation, and 
within benefit corporations under the Model Act. 
A. WHAT IS A BENEFIT CORPORATION? 
As a social enterprise, benefit corporations are a mix of for-
profit and non-profit corporations. While for-profit corporations 
pursue options that maximize shareholder value,29 and non-
profit corporations pursue activities that benefit social purpos-
es without distributions,30 benefit corporations pursue social 
purposes and have shareholders who receive dividends, but re-
alize that pursuing social missions may decrease profitability.31 
1. History of the Benefit Corporation: Born of the Social 
Enterprise Movement and Constituency Statute 
With the trend of supporting sustainable products and ser-
vices, consumers want to make purchases from, and investors 
want to invest in, corporations that recognize their impact on 
the environment.32 Research suggests that sixty-eight million 
 
 27. See Kevin V. Tu, Socially Conscious Corporations and Shareholder 
Profit, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121, 121 (2016). 
 28. Callison, supra note 23, at 145. 
 29. Id. at 143–44. 
 30. Tu, supra note 27, at 156–57. 
 31. Jacob B. Puhl, Note, To B or Not to B: Why Ohio Should Enact Benefit 
Corporation Legislation To Protect Small Businesses in Ohio Who Wish To 
Make a Profit While Making a Difference, 9 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. 
L.J. 173, 187–88 (2014). 
 32. Benefits of Becoming a Sustainable Business, ECO-OFFICIENCY, http:// 
www.eco-officiency.com/benefits_becoming_sustainable_business.html (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2017); see Walker, supra note 19, at 153; WILLIAM H. CLARK, 
JR. & LARRY VRANKA, THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT CORPORA-
TION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF SO-
CIAL ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC 2–3 (2013), 
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consumers in the United States base their purchasing decisions 
on their sense of social and environmental values.33 While for-
profit corporations, non-profit corporations, and governmental 
organizations are the first three sectors of legal entities, social 
enterprises represent an emerging “fourth sector.”34 Although 
“social enterprise” has been defined in many ways, this Note 
will use a broader definition of “social enterprise” as an “entity 
that uses commercial activity to drive revenue with the com-
mon good as its primary purpose.”35 
As social enterprises do not fit perfectly within the current 
three sectors of legal entities, social entrepreneurs demand new 
corporate forms to accommodate their dual goals.36 Benefit cor-
porations help meet this need, as they neither adopt a “corpora-
tion-focused model that aligns corporate purpose, best inter-
ests, and fiduciary duties, nor do they adopt a fully rendered 
stakeholder model.”37 Instead, benefit corporations require con-
sideration of stakeholders along with the enforcement rights 
given to directors and shareholders.38 In general, benefit corpo-




[hereinafter WHITE PAPER] (stating that consumers prefer to purchase prod-
ucts and services from socially conscientious corporations). 
 33. Benefits of Becoming a Sutainable Business, supra note 32. The 2014 
Neilsen Global Survey on Corporate Social Responsibility found that fifty-two 
percent of consumers check product packaging to ensure sustainable impact 
and fifty-five percent will pay extra for products and services from companies 
committed to social and environmental impact. NIELSEN, DOING WELL BY DO-
ING GOOD 2 (2014), http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/ 
reports-downloads/2014%20Reports/global-corporate-social-responsibility 
-report-june-2014.pdf. 
 34. Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise 
Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 376–77 (2009). However, the social enterprise 
movement represents a return to early United States expectations of corporate 
activity before the nineteenth century. Johnson, supra note 12, at 277. Corpo-
rations were “public-serving” and incorporating was not for those companies 
having a private selfish purpose. Id. Also, there was no expectation that corpo-
rations achieve private financial gain as the main goal. Id. 
 35. Murray, supra note 17, at 347–48. 
 36. Lacovara, supra note 20, at 819. 
 37. Johnson, supra note 12, at 293. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Murray, supra note 17, at 348. While most statutes identify this new 
entity as a “benefit corporation” with either a general or specific public benefit, 
some states identify them as “public benefit corporations,” “social purpose cor-
porations,” or “sustainable business corporations.” See CAL. CORP. CODE 
§ 2500 (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-101-501–509 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
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Another precursor to the benefit corporation is the permis-
sive constituency provision in state corporate statutes,40 which 
is the oldest and most common type of progressive corporate 
legislation.41 Although these statutes differ slightly by state, 
they all permit directors to consider the impact a corporate ac-
tion may have on non-shareholders.42 Usually, these non-
shareholder stakeholders consist of consumers, suppliers, em-
ployees, creditors, and the community.43 If a corporate decision 
would harm these stakeholders, the directors may “trade-off a 
reduction in shareholder gains for enhanced stakeholder wel-
fare.”44 Although benefit corporations can be viewed as an al-
ternative to constituency statutes, many states are enacting 
benefit corporation legislation in addition to their pre-existing 
constituency statutes.45 While permissive constituency statutes 
do not require directors to consider interests of constituencies 
other than shareholders, benefit corporations do require the 
consideration.46 
Many states have relied on the Model Act to draft their 
benefit corporation legislation. The Model Act was drafted by B 
 
8, §§ 361–368 (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 420D-1–13; WASH. REV. CODE 
§§ 23B.25.005–.150 (2012). California has legislation for social purpose corpo-
rations, as well as benefit corporations. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 14600–14631 
(2011). 
 40. Sean W. Brownridge, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Unocal and the De-
fensive Mechanism Hidden in Corporate Benefit Purpose, 60 VILL. L. REV. 903, 
931 (2015). 
 41. Shealy, supra note 18, at 703. Many constituency provisions in state 
corporate statutes were enacted in response to takeover activity in the 1980s 
as a way to protect local businesses. Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Inter-
preting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 23–26 
(1992). Starting in 1983 with Pennsylvania, forty-one states currently have 
some form of a constituency statute. See ANDREW KEAY, THE ENLIGHTENED 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE PRINCIPLE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 187 (2013); 
Shealy, supra note 18, at 691. The statutes have been said to reflect argu-
ments made by Harvard Law Professor E. Merrick Dodd in the 1930s. Id. He 
stated, “The public saw companies as economic institutions that have a social 
service role to play as well as making profits for shareholders.” Id. 
 42. Anthony Bisconti, Note, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency 
Statutes Protect Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 781–82 (2009). 
 43. Orts, supra note 41, at 16. 
 44. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency 
Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 994–95 (1992). See generally WHITE PAPER, su-
pra note 32, at 8 (explaining how constituency statutes were developed as a 
defense mechanism to hostile takeovers). 
 45. Shealy, supra note 18, at 704–05. 
 46. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(a). 
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Lab, a non-profit organization with a mission to solve social 
and environmental issues using the power of business.47 B Lab 
then lobbied states to pass benefit corporation statutes based 
on the Model Act.48 Maryland became the first state in 2010 to 
pass benefit corporation legislation, which is very similar to the 
Model Act.49 Since 2010, thirty states and the District of Co-
lumbia have passed similar benefit corporation legislation, and 
seven other states are in the process of passing legislation.50 
This legislation allows entrepreneurs to choose a business enti-
ty with an embedded social mission, and allows existing corpo-
rations to convert into it.51 
2. Three Main Components of Benefit Corporations: Purpose, 
Accountability, and Transparency 
Similar to traditional for-profit corporations, benefit corpo-
rations have three main components: purpose, accountability, 
and transparency.52 Benefit corporations, however, have their 
own distinct version of each. 
First, the corporate purpose of the benefit corporation must 
be to pursue a public benefit.53 Benefit corporation directors 
must pursue the general public benefit and have the option to 
 
 47. Our History, B CORP., https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/ 
the-non-profit-behind-b-corps/our-history (last visited Mar. 6, 2017). 
 48. Brownridge, supra note 40, at 904. 
 49. Walker, supra note 19, at 156. 
 50. State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp 
.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Mar. 6, 2017). Italy also 
adopted benefit corporation legislation, and similar national legislation is 
pending in Taiwan, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Columbia. John Montgom-
ery, Mastering the Benefit Corporation, BUS. L. TODAY, July 2016, at 1, 1–2. 
 51. McKenzie Holden Granum, Note, With the Emergence of Public Benefit 
Corporations, Directors of Traditional For-Profit Companies Should Tread 
Cautiously, but Welcome the Opportunity To Invest in Social Enterprise, 38 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 765, 766 (2015). Thus far, only private companies have be-
come benefit corporations; not one publicly traded company has become a ben-
efit corporation. Id. at 767. However, Laureate Education, a private company 
that is a benefit corporation, has recently filed to become a publicly traded 
company. N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, supra note 14. 
 52. FAQ, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/faq (last visited Mar. 6, 
2017). 
 53. James D. Cox & Thomas Lee Hazen, The Evolution of Corporations in 
England and America: Benefit Corporations, in TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 2:14, at 16 (3d ed. Supp. 2015). This differs from traditional 
for-profit corporations, which are allowed to form for any lawful purpose, but 
do not have a required particular purpose. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.01 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2008). 
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also pursue one or more specific public benefits listed in the 
company’s articles of incorporation.54 In the Model Act, a “gen-
eral public benefit” is a “material positive impact on society and 
the environment, taken as a whole, [assessed against a third-
party standard,] from the business and operations of a benefit 
corporation.”55 A “specific public benefit” is anything that con-
fers any particular benefit on society or the environment.56 The 
Model Act includes seven examples of possibilities for a “specif-
ic public benefit”: (1) providing low-income communities with 
beneficial products or services; (2) promoting economic oppor-
tunity for communities; (3) preserving the environment; (4) im-
proving human health; (5) promoting the advancement of 
knowledge, arts, or sciences; (6) increasing the flow of capital to 
entities which benefit the environment or society; and (7) any 
other particular benefit on society or the environment.57 
Whether a benefit corporation chooses to pursue a specific 
public benefit has an important effect on the scope of a benefit 
corporation’s operation. While the general public benefit allows 
a company to create a materially positive impact on society and 
the environment as a whole, creating a specific public benefit 
purpose is an opportunity to concentrate on a corporation’s 
unique mission and priorities. Benefit corporations pursuing 
only a general public benefit have a broader commitment than 
those that also select a specific public benefit. Choosing both a 
general public benefit and specific public benefit allows a bene-
fit corporation to pursue its unique, individual objectives while 
also assuring its pursuit of broader societal goals.58 
State statutes may provide guidance for creating appropri-
ate specific public benefits, but corporations will likely draft 
specific language tailored for their own purposes. While the 
Model Act and state statutes do not outline a level of required 
specificity, a specific public benefit should be more specific than 
the “material positive impact on the society and the environ-
ment” of the general public benefit requirement.59 While a spe-
 
 54. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(a). 
 55. Id. § 102. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Thomas J. White III, Note, Benefit Corporations: Increased Oversight 
Through Creation of the Benefit Corporation Commission, 41 J. LEGIS. 329, 
341 (2015). 
 59. Delaware Public Benefit Corporations: Choosing a Specific Benefit, B 
LAB, http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Delaware%20Public%20Benefit% 
  
2017] PROVIDING CLARITY 1759 
 
cific public benefit purpose should be more unique than the 
general public benefit purpose, benefit corporations should cre-
ate a specific public benefit with a comprehensive purpose to 
allow for flexibility in the future.60 For example, if a corpora-
tion’s specific public benefit purpose is to promote innovation in 
education and improve access to quality schooling, the corpora-
tion should not name specific methods regarding how the cor-
poration will achieve that purpose, because the corporation 
may evolve and the specific methods may change.61 
Second, the accountability for the director’s standard of 
conduct has expanded in comparison to traditional for-profit 
corporations. When making corporate decisions, directors “shall 
consider the effects of any action or inaction upon” the share-
holders and stakeholder groups62 as a whole.63 There are six 
non-shareholder stakeholders that directors must consider: 
(1) company employees; (2) company customers; (3) the compa-
ny’s community; (4) local and global environment; (5) short-
term and long-term interests of the company; and (6) the com-
pany’s ability to accomplish the general and specific public ben-
efit.64 The Model Act, however, does not provide guidance for 
determining which groups may fit within these stakeholder 
categories or how to accomplish the benefits. Because benefit 
corporations must consider a general and an optional specific 




 60. Id. 
 61. Id. For instance, Patagonia’s specific public benefits exemplify a 
workable balance between specificity and breadth. While Patagonia is a public 
benefit corporation, it has also chosen to adopt specific public benefits, six 
overall. These six specific public benefits are: (1) “1% for the [p]lanet” for year-
ly charitable contributions; (2) “[b]uild the best product and cause no unneces-
sary harm to the planet or its inhabitants”; (3) “[c]onduct [o]perations 
[c]ausing [n]o [u]nnecessary [h]arm”; (4) “[s]haring [b]est [p]ractices with 
[o]ther [c]ompanies”; (5) “[t]ransparency”; and (6) “[p]roviding a [s]upportive 
[w]ork [e]nvironment.” PATAGONIA WORKS, ANNUAL BENEFIT CORPORATION 
REPORT 8–11 (2013), http://www.patagonia.com/on/demandware.static/Sites 
-patagonia-us-Site/Library-Sites-PatagoniaShared/en_US/PDFUS/bcorp_ 
annual_report_2014.pdf (describing each of Patagonia’s specific public benefit 
purposes). 
 62. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(a)(1). 
 63. See id. § 102 (stating that the required general public benefit purpose 
is a “material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a 
whole,” so directors must also consider the impact “as a whole”). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. § 201. 
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goals even at the risk of reducing shareholder profitability.66 At 
the same time, benefit corporation statutes generally allow 
shareholders, not other stakeholders, to commence and main-
tain an enforcement proceeding against benefit corporation di-
rectors.67 
Third, the transparency of the benefit corporation requires 
disclosure of an annual report addressing the impact of the so-
cial and environmental performance with reference to a credi-
ble, independent, comprehensive, and transparent third-party 
standard.68 While traditional for-profit corporations also file 
annual reports, the annual benefit corporation reports include 
a narrative description of “the ways in which the benefit corpo-
ration pursued general public benefit during the year and the 
extent to which general public benefit was created.”69 Overall, 
the corporate purpose, accountability, and transparency of a 
benefit corporation are distinct from those guiding a traditional 
for-profit corporation. 
B. GENERAL DIRECTOR DUTIES WITHIN TRADITIONAL FOR-
PROFIT CORPORATIONS, NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS, AND 
BENEFIT CORPORATIONS 
In order to understand the uniqueness of the standard of 
conduct for benefit corporation directors, it is important to dis-
tinguish director duties and liability from traditional for-profit 
corporations and non-profit corporations. 
1. Director Duty Within Traditional For-Profit Corporations 
Corporations are created under state law, and their direc-
tors are subject to standards of conduct created by state law. 
Directors oversee the activities of a corporation and act on be-
half of the shareholders.70 While managing and directing the 
 
 66. Callison, supra note 23, at 145. 
 67. See Jacob E. Hasler, Note, Contracting for Good: How Benefit Corpora-
tions Empower Investors and Redefine Shareholder Value, 100 VA. L. REV. 
1279, 1315–16 (2014). These proceedings can normally be brought for failing to 
pursue or create the general public benefit or specific public benefit purpose 
set forth in the articles of incorporation, or violating any obligation, duty or 
standard of conduct within the statute. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 102. For 
further discussion regarding benefit corporation director duty and liability, see 
infra Part I.B.3. 
 68. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 401. 
 69. Id. § 401(a)(1)(i). 
 70. Shiva Mirzanian, Note, Washington’s Social Purpose Corporation: 
Creating Accountability for Corporations or Simply Providing a Halo to Unde-
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company, directors owe certain duties—fiduciary duties—to the 
corporation itself and to the corporation’s shareholders.71 State 
corporate law has long recognized three basic fiduciary duties 
for corporate directors: duty of loyalty, duty of care, and duty of 
good faith.72 Under the duty of loyalty, directors are required to 
pursue the best interests of the corporation73 and refrain from 
using their corporate positions for personal gain.74 Under the 
duty of care, directors must exercise good business judgment 
and use ordinary prudence in the operation of the business.75 
The duty of good faith is sometimes referred to as a separate 
obligation but is also a part of the duties of care and loyalty to 
advance the best interests of the corporation.76 
While the director duties of loyalty, care, and good faith are 
mandatory under statutory law, corporate directors also have 
duties that stem from case law interpreting the duties of the 
statutory law. In general, case law dictates that directors of 
traditional for-profit corporations must maximize shareholder 
profit when fulfilling the corporate duties of loyalty, care, and 
good faith.77 Almost one hundred years ago, the Michigan Su-
preme Court clearly articulated this standard in Dodge v. Ford 
Motor Co.: “A business corporation is organized and carried on 
primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the 
directors are to be employed for that end . . . .”78 Dodge remains 
 
serving Corporations?, 5 SEATTLE J. ENVTL. L. 255, 260 (2015). 
 71. Andrew S. Gold, Dynamic Fiduciary Duties, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 491, 
491 (2012). 
 72. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) 
(stating that directors have a “triad” of duties to a corporation). 
 73. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008). 
 74. AM. BAR. ASS’N, COMM’N ON CORP. LAWS, THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S 
GUIDEBOOK 1599–1600 (rev ed. 1978). 
 75. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008); Robert J. 
Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1139, 1140–41 (2013). 
 76. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011); Leo E. 
Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in 
Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 673–90 (2010) (discussing good faith under 
Delaware corporate law as well as “[t]he [r]ise and [d]emise of an 
[i]ndependent [d]uty of [g]ood [f ]aith”). 
 77. Granum, supra note 51, at 771. “Shareholder primacy” is a term used 
to describe the control shareholders have over the corporation and its direc-
tors. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 
277–78 (1998). 
 78. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
  
1762 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1749 
 
good law and the shareholder wealth maximization theory has 
been widely upheld79 and accepted by courts. 
However, a strict reading of shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion may not represent the current state of modern corporate 
law.80 The trend of corporate law is “moving away from historic 
shareholder-centric values towards a more stakeholder-centric 
approach.”81 No statute actually mandates shareholder wealth 
or profit maximization, only case law.82 
2. Director Duty and Liability Within Non-Profit Corporations 
Non-profit corporations are generally established for chari-
table or religious purposes.83 Non-profit corporations have a de-
fault governing structure with a board of directors,84 for which 
the directors also generally have the fiduciary duties of care, 
loyalty, and good faith.85 The three duties are similar to that of 
 
 79. In eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, the Delaware Court of 
Chancery reaffirmed that corporate directors are obligated to maximize 
shareholder value pursuant to their fiduciary duties. 16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 
2010). Former Chancellor Chandler stated that the directors are bound by the 
standard of conduct accompanying the for-profit entity, including “acting to 
promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.” Id. at 
34. Current Chancellor Strine states that “the corporate law requires direc-
tors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to 
maximize profits for the stockholders.” Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing 
Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 135, 155 (2012). 
 80. WHITE PAPER, supra note 32, at 8. 
 81. Rugger Burke & Samuel P. Bragg, Sustainability in the Boardroom: 
Reconsidering Fiduciary Duty Under Revlon in the Wake of Public Benefit 
Corporation Legislation, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 59, 75 (2014). 
 82. Jessica Chu, Note, Filling a Nonexistent Gap: Benefit Corporations 
and the Myth of Shareholder Wealth Maximization, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
155, 168 (2012); see also Mark A. Underberg, Benefit Corporations vs. “Regu-
lar” Corporations: A Harmful Dichotomy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERN-
ANCE & FIN. REG. (May 13, 2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/05/13/ 
benefit-corporations-vs-regular-corporations-a-harmful-dichotomy (contending 
that there is a mistaken rationale “that existing law prevents . . . directors 
from considering the impact of corporate decisions on other stakeholders[ ] 
[and] the environment”). See generally PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1992) (noting that a 
business corporation maximizes corporate profit and shareholder gain, but 
that it must be constrained by social imperatives and might be qualified by 
social needs). 
 83. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 13, at 350–51. 
 84. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.01(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008). 
 85. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 300 (AM. 
LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). For a discussion about the meaning of 
the three duties, see supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text. 
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a traditional for-profit corporation director, except the non-
profit duty of loyalty requires pursuit of the corporation’s chari-
table purpose as opposed to the pursuit of for-profit wealth 
maximization for shareholders.86 Non-profit corporate directors 
also owe a duty of obedience which requires adherence to the 
purposes stated in the corporation’s charter for the greater so-
cial good.87 As non-profit corporations are tax-exempt entities,88 
they are prohibited from making any distribution of income and 
must re-invest any “profit” back into the corporation.89 Also, 
they cannot obtain financing from investors.90 Without share-
holders, the non-profit corporation director owes the duties only 
to the entity itself. 
If a director breaches a duty owed to the non-profit corpo-
ration, there are limited remedies available. The basic remedies 
include director removal or corporation dissolution by the at-
torney general, or a derivative suit brought by the members,91 
other directors, or the corporation itself.92 Otherwise, members 
must either encourage the other directors of the corporation to 
sue for breach of duties on behalf of the corporation or bring the 
complaint to the attorney general’s attention to bring an en-
forcement action,93 because members do not individually have 
standing to sue.94 Overall, there are limited remedies against 
 
 86. Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family Serv., Inc., 112 S.W.3d 486, 
503–04 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). 
 87. James Edward Harris, The Nonprofit Corporation Act of 1993: Consid-
ering the Election To Apply the New Law to Old Corporations, 16 U. ARK. LIT-
TLE ROCK L.J. 1, 16 (1994) (describing the board’s obligation to remain faithful 
to the organization’s mission and purpose). 
 88. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2012) (listing the types of endeavors that can re-
ceive tax exemption for non-profit corporations). 
 89. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 2(c) (1964) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 
2008). 
 90. Robson, supra note 22, at 520 (discussing that regulations restrict 
non-profit organizations from raising capital through investors). 
 91. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.30 (1986) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 
2008) (stating that the members of non-profit corporations can bring a deriva-
tive suit on behalf of the corporation to enforce duties owed to the corporation). 
 92. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 13, at 405. A majority of states provide 
the attorney general with the authority to police non-profit corporations. Id. at 
403. 
 93. Brenda Boykin, Note, The Nonprofit Corporation in North Carolina: 
Recognizing a Right to Member Derivative Suits, 63 N.C. L. REV. 999, 999 
(1985). Beyond derivative suits and actions brought by attorney generals, 
states have other various actions that can be brought. For example, donors can 
bring suit for mismanagement of charity funds in California. See Holt v. Coll. 
of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932, 937 (Cal. 1964). 
 94. See, e.g., Boykin, supra note 93, at 1008 (stating that because North 
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non-profit directors who fail to achieve the corporate purpose or 
other wrongful corporate governance. 
3. Director Duty and Liability Within Benefit Corporations 
Under the Model Act 
As with traditional for-profit and non-profit corporations, 
benefit corporation directors have the fiduciary duties of loyal-
ty, care, and good faith.95 The duties of loyalty and good faith 
for benefit corporation directors are similar to those of a tradi-
tional for-profit corporation, focusing on conflict of interest is-
sues.96 However, the Model Act expands the duty of care from 
the traditional for-profit corporation and requires directors to 
consider short-term and long-term impacts of their corporate 
decisions on the six non-shareholder stakeholders as well as 
the corporation.97 The expansion of fiduciary duties to consider 
other stakeholder interests by mandate is at the heart of what 
it means to be a benefit corporation and shields benefit corpora-
tion directors from the Dodge standard.98 Social entrepreneurs 
consider benefit corporations attractive because of these duties 
requiring directors to consider the interests of the non-
shareholder stakeholders. 
Under the Model Act, benefit corporations must strive for a 
general public benefit purpose, meaning a “material positive 
impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole . . . .”99 
Therefore, directors must consider all the effects “as a whole” of 
the corporation on society and the environment when making 
corporate decisions. Directors “shall consider the effects of any 
action or inaction upon” the six stakeholder groups.100 Under 
the Model Act, directors may also consider “other pertinent fac-
tors or the interests of any other group that they deem appro-
 
Carolina’s Nonprofit Corporation Act does not provide for member derivative 
suits, members must rely on the Attorney General or the board for enforce-
ment). 
 95. Page, supra note 17, at 362–64. 
 96. Id. 
 97. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(a)(1)(vi); see, e.g., William H. Clark, 
Jr., The New Pennsylvania Benefit Corporation Law, 84 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 65, 67 
(2013) (highlighting the inclusion of this consideration in Pennsylvania’s bene-
fit corporation law). 
 98. See Burke & Bragg, supra note 81, at 74–76. For a discussion of the 
Dodge shareholder profit maximization standard, see supra notes 77–79 and 
accompanying text. 
 99. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 102. 
 100. Id. § 301(a)(1). 
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priate,” as well as the interests referred to in the state’s con-
stituency statute.101 The Model Act, however, does not delineate 
how the director should “consider” the interests of stakeholder 
groups or otherwise prioritize them.102 
While directors are required to consider the impact of cor-
porate decisions on six non-shareholder stakeholders, directors 
do not owe a fiduciary duty to them, nor to beneficiaries of the 
general or specific public benefits.103 Therefore, directors are 
protected against suits brought directly by non-shareholder 
stakeholders and beneficiaries of the corporate purpose. How-
ever, shareholders are permitted to bring suit on behalf of those 
third parties. Shareholders, directors, investors in the parent 
company of a benefit corporation subsidiary with five percent or 
more equity interest, or the corporation itself are the only par-
ties permitted to bring an action against the benefit corporation 
or its directors.104 The only action permitted is a benefit en-
forcement proceeding, which can be brought for the “violation of 
any obligation, duty, or standard of conduct,” the “failure to 
pursue or create [the] public benefit[s] . . . set forth in its arti-
cles,” or the failure to consider the interests of various stake-
holders listed in the statute.105 However, a benefit corporation 
can provide in its articles of incorporation or bylaws one or 
more identified stakeholders who may also bring a benefit en-
forcement proceeding.106 The identified stakeholders can claim a 
breach of director duties for failing to pursue or create the gen-
eral or specific public benefit, but cannot allege a breach of duty 
against the stakeholders themselves.107 The limited standing to 
sue protects the benefit corporation from unknown liability that 
would be a disincentive to becoming a benefit corporation.108 
 
 101. Id. § 301(a)(2). 
 102. Id. § 301(a)(3). 
 103. Id. § 301(d). 
 104. See id. §§ 301, 305(a)–(b); see also, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-10(b) 
(2016) (allowing investors owning ten percent or more of the parent company 
to bring suit); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.13(b) (2011) (allowing investors 
owning ten percent or more of the parent company to bring suit). 
 105. See MODEL ACT, supra note 7, §§ 102, 305(a); see also, e.g., N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 14A:18-10(a)–(b) (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.13(a)–(b). A claim 
of action can also be brought for failure to post benefit reports on the Internet 
or to distribute paper copies. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 102. 
 106. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 305(b). 
 107. Id. § 301(d); WHITE PAPER, supra note 32, at app. A at 13. 
 108. WHITE PAPER, supra note 32, at 21. 
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Along with the limited claims of action permitted, the 
Model Act also insulates directors through exculpation of per-
sonal liability with respect to monetary damages.109 The reason-
ing for further director insulation is to allow directors to focus 
on their responsibilities and to “eliminate director fear where 
there is no court precedent for which to quantify liability.”110 
Thus, directors cannot be held personally liable for a failure to 
create, or even pursue, a general or specific public benefit.111 
Overall, the benefit corporation acts as a middle ground be-
tween for-profit and non-profit corporations, pursuing the social 
good and providing distributions for its shareholders. Within 
the overall framework, benefit corporation directors must con-
sider the impact of corporate actions on shareholders and nu-
merous stakeholders. While the Model Act has been adopted by 
most states, many states have also created different benefit 
corporation legislation. Therefore, it is important to recognize 
the differences between some of the statutes and identify effec-
tive duty provisions in order to develop an ideal standard of 
conduct for directors. 
II.  COMPARISON OF DIRECTOR DUTIES WITHIN 
BENEFIT CORPORATION STATUTES   
There is no case law interpreting the standard of conduct 
for directors of benefit corporations, as they are new legal enti-
ties.112 Exacerbating the uncertainty of this limited guidance, 
state statutes have notable differences with regards to director 
standard of conduct. This Part explores the five identifiable is-
sues with the lack of sufficient guidance for standard of conduct 
for directors of benefit corporations by comparing various state 
benefit corporation legislation that have problematic issues. 
Section A addresses the issue of requiring or allowing a general 
or specific public benefit. Section B discusses the issues of re-
quiring directors to consider inactions as well as actions. Sec-
tion C compares statutes that require directors to “consider” 
stakeholder interests with statutes that require directors to 
“balance” stakeholder interests. Section D debates whether di-
rectors should be required to consider the ability of the benefit 
corporation to “accomplish” or simply “pursue” the public bene-
 
 109. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(c). 
 110. WHITE PAPER, supra note 32, at 20. 
 111. See MODEL ACT, supra note 7, §§ 301(c), 303(c). 
 112. Lacovara, supra note 20, at 826 n.32. 
  
2017] PROVIDING CLARITY 1767 
 
fit purposes. Last, Section E critiques the number and variety 
of stakeholder interests that directors must consider and sug-
gests prioritizing those interests. As these are the five main 
concerns within the standards that lack clarity, it is necessary 
to identify the options that provide more guidance for directors. 
A. GENERAL PUBLIC BENEFIT VS. SPECIFIC PUBLIC BENEFIT 
The benefit corporation was created so directors would be 
required to consider the “triple bottom line” of people, the plan-
et, and profit when making decisions.113 To ensure the triple 
bottom line, the Model Act and many states’ acts require bene-
fit corporations to have a general public benefit purpose to 
make a material, positive impact on society and the environ-
ment as a whole.114 However, “[t]he mandate that a benefit cor-
poration pursue a ‘general public benefit purpose’ is too vague 
because it does not provide a practical way for directors to 
make decisions.”115 
The breadth of the general public benefit and the limited 
ability for stakeholders to bring an enforcement action provides 
benefit corporation directors too much decision-making free-
dom.116 This freedom can allow director abuse and self-dealing 
or irresponsible directors, more so than with traditional for-
profit corporations.117 Focusing on the difficulty to consider all 
the stakeholders within the general public benefit, courts will 
likely give the benefit corporation directors more discretion 
than traditional for-profit corporation directors, thus exacerbat-
ing the above concerns.118 Due to the lack of specificity for direc-
tor guidance, benefit corporation directors may be able to justi-
fy abusive actions by pointing to a public benefit justification or 
 
 113. See Slaper & Hall, supra note 11. 
 114. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 201(a); J. Haskell Murray, Corporate 
Forms of Social Enterprise: Comparing the State Statutes 1–2, 5 (Jan. 15, 
2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=1988556. 
 115. J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certi-
fications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 30 (2012). 
Minnesota even requires directors of benefit corporations to consider “future 
generations” within its general public benefit. MINN. STAT. § 304A.021 subdiv. 
3 (2016). This could become complicated and difficult to achieve. 
 116. See Walker, supra note 19, at 169. 
 117. See J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed: 
How Benefit Corporations Address Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created, and 
Suggestions for Change, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 85, 108 (2012). 
 118. Walker, supra note 19, at 177 (describing how courts will likely be 
even more deferential to the decisions of benefit corporation directors). 
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a private shareholder benefit justification.119 In this way, “mul-
tiple bottom lines” for benefit corporation directors will likely 
result in even more reduced director liability.120 Therefore, the 
general public benefit may be too broad for a benefit corpora-
tion to accountably pursue. 
While the general public benefit may be too expansive, a 
specific public benefit allows the benefit corporation a greater 
chance to pursue its more tailored purpose, because directors 
can more easily identify the objective.121 A specific public benefit 
purpose can “also provide a more workable system of board ac-
countability.”122 A benefit corporation may be more successful in 
fulfilling its social purpose with a required specific public bene-
fit that provides a clear objective, while retaining an optional 
general public benefit to serve society more generally. 
Some states moved in the direction of more directorial 
guidance by requiring benefit corporations to choose a specific 
public benefit purpose or purposes123 without requiring a gen-
eral public benefit at all.124 Delaware and Colorado require the 
certification of incorporation to list “[one] or more specific pub-
lic benefits” to be pursued within the corporation’s purpose.125 
This requirement gives shareholders notice and control over 
the mission of the public benefit corporation.126 The Colorado 
benefit corporation drafting group believed that the focus on 
the specific public benefit was “more likely to achieve the 
shareholders’ goals” and would allow director flexibility.127 Also, 
California and Washington’s social purpose corporations and 
Minnesota’s specific public benefit corporation do not require a 
 
 119. See Murray, supra note 115, at 37 n.168 (“[S]ubtle selfishness . . . will 
be easier for a manager to hide if the benefit corporation is not forced to make 
its priorities clear.”). 
 120. See Walker, supra note 19, at 169. 
 121. Murray, supra note 115, at 32–33. 
 122. Id. at 33. 
 123. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-503(1)(a) (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§§ 362(a)(1), 365 (a) (2016). 
 124. See e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-503 (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 362(a) (2016); see also Callison, supra note 23, at 155, 157 (“Delaware . . . es-
chews the ‘general public benefit’ requirement in favor of specific public bene-
fits . . . .”). 
 125. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-503(1)(a) (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 362(a)(1) (2016). 
 126. Plerhoples, supra note 18, at 256. 
 127. Herrick K. Lidstone, Jr., The Long and Winding Road to Public Bene-
fit Corporations in Colorado, 43 COLO. LAW. 39, 42 (2014). 
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general public benefit.128 Research shows that in Minnesota, 
over two-thirds of the benefit corporations are specific public 
benefit corporations.129 The corporate decision of many compa-
nies to include a specific public benefit appears practical,130 as 
requiring a specific public benefit purpose focuses the goals of 
the benefit corporation and guides directors when discharging 
their duties.  
Because the ambiguous nature of the general public benefit 
purpose can allow for director abuse, benefit corporations 
should require a specific public benefit.131 However, those who 
create general public benefit corporations may be looking for 
the ability to consider many stakeholders. Also, research sug-
gests that sixty-eight million United States consumers base 
their purchasing decisions on their sense of social and envi-
ronmental values as a whole,132 so consumers may want corpo-
rations to consider a variety of stakeholders. Therefore, a 
workable solution would be to allow benefit corporations an op-
tion of the general public benefit in order to focus on a specific 
public benefit and allow its directors more clarity and guid-
ance.133 
 
 128. Murray, supra note 114, at 1–2. 
 129. In 2015, thirty-six of the fifty-five Minnesotan entities that converted 
or formed as benefit corporations were specific public benefit corporations. For 
data on Minnesota business filings, see Search Business Filings, OFF. MINN. 
SECRETARY ST., https://mblsportal.sos.state.mn.us/Business/Search. A spread-
sheet compiling this data is on file with the author. 
 130. Statutes should yield to practicality, and legislation should follow 
practicality. See Ana M. Gonzalez, Note, “Yes We Scan”: Using SEC Disclo-
sures To Compel and Standardize Tech Companies’ Reports on Government 
Requests for User Data, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1058, 1074, 1084 (2015). 
 131. See supra notes 114–20 and accompanying text. 
 132. Benefits of Becoming a Sustainable Business, ECO-OFFICIENCY, http:// 
www.eco-officiency.com/benefits_becoming_sustainable_business.html (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2017). 
 133. Providing the general public benefit as an opt-in provision would 
make it more likely for the benefit corporation to follow the specific public 
benefit model, as the corporation would have to take affirmative action to opt 
in to the general public benefit. See generally Lauren E. Willis, Why Not Pri-
vacy by Default?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 61 (2014) (discussing the behavioral 
consequences of the use of a default scheme). Omission bias creates the ten-
dency to favor inaction over action, so the default of the specific public benefit 
may be more attractive. See Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Reference Points 
and Omission Bias, 59 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 
475, 478 (1994). 
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B. CONSIDER EFFECTS OF ACTION VS. CONSIDER EFFECTS OF 
ACTION AND INACTION 
The Model Act requires directors to consider “the effects of 
any action or inaction” on the six groups of stakeholders.134 This 
provision is vague as to what “inaction” means, especially in re-
lation to each company director individually. It would be im-
possible for directors to be held liable for failing to consider the 
impact of inactions that were not discussed. While the provi-
sion has not been interpreted, requiring consideration of un-
known inactions “imposes an incalculable burden on directors 
that cannot be taken seriously.”135 
To illustrate the potential problems with requiring the con-
sideration of “inactions” under the Model Act, consider the fol-
lowing example: a benefit corporation produces toxic substanc-
es that run off into a nearby river—an environmental impact 
that the directors must consider pursuant to the company’s 
general public benefit. To stop the pollution, the directors con-
sider building an infiltration system. The directors ultimately 
decide not to build the infiltration system due to its cost. Be-
cause of its vague use of the word “inaction,” the Model Act 
could require the director to consider not only the impact of 
failing to build the infiltration system, but also potentially in-
numerable “inactions” that might not have been contemplated, 
including routing the runoff water to a well or building a berm 
to divert the water runoff. Thus, despite the directors never 
contemplating these ideas, they may still somehow be required 
to consider the impact of those “inactions.” 
By contrast, the Minnesota Public Benefit Corporation Act 
(Minnesota Act) requires directors to consider “the effects of 
any proposed, contemplated, or actual conduct.”136 This provi-
sion only requires the directors to consider the impact of deci-
sions they actually discussed, but did not act upon. In the water 
runoff example, the Minnesota Act would require the director 
to consider the impact of failing to build the infiltration system. 
It would not require the directors to consider the “inaction” of 
ideas never discussed, like building a well or berm. While the 
two provisions may have the same intended meaning, the word-
 
 134. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(a)(1) (emphasis added). Twenty-three 
state statutes follow the Model Act for this provision. Murray, supra note 114, 
at 1–2. 
 135. Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate 
Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1027 (2013). 
 136. MINN. STAT. § 304A.201 subdiv. 1 (2016). 
  
2017] PROVIDING CLARITY 1771 
 
ing within the Minnesota Act clarifies the meaning of a possible 
inaction as a proposed or contemplated action. 
C. “BALANCE” STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS VS. “CONSIDER” 
STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS 
While directors must “consider” the effects of action or in-
action upon the six stakeholders under the Model Act,137 direc-
tors under the Delaware Public Benefit Corporations Act (Del-
aware Act) must “balance” (1) the shareholder pecuniary 
interests; (2) “the best interests of those materially affected by 
the corporation’s conduct”; and (3) the specific public benefit 
listed within the certificate.138 While the courts have yet to clar-
ify the meaning of “consider” and “balance” within the statutes, 
there has been considerable disagreement about the meaning of 
the two terms. The statutes with balancing standards do not 
require any specific decision as a result, nor give greater weight 
to one factor over other factors.139 “‘Balance’ could mean giving 
exactly equal weight to each factor, but more likely means giv-
ing some weight to each factor.”140 Balancing the stakeholders 
may be impossible and frustrating for directors. Also, “balance” 
seems more active than “consider” because each interest must 
receive attention.141 “Balance” fits the concept of the “triple bot-
tom line” where each interest must be in balance with the oth-
ers.142 
On the other hand, “‘[c]onsider’ . . . only requires directors 
to think about each factor and could allow directors to com-
pletely disregard a factor after considering it.”143 When utilizing 
the term “consider,” board decisions may be accompanied by an 
organized formality reciting to ensure the board “considered” 
the effect of each decision on the listed stakeholders, as opposed 
 
 137. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(a)(1). 
 138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2016). Colorado has also utilized the 
balancing requirement because it is more consistent with boards of directors’ 
typical methods of operation. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-506(1); Lidstone, 
supra note 127, at 40. 
 139. Lidstone, supra note 127, at 44. However, shareholders could draft the 
benefit corporation articles of incorporation to be more specific or give more 
weight to certain factors. 
 140. Murray, supra note 17, at 355–56 n.64. 
 141. Walker, supra note 19, at 177–78. Balancing “is arguably more oner-
ous than” considering. Murray, supra note 17, at 355. 
 142. Walker, supra note 19, at 178. 
 143. Murray, supra note 17, at 355–56 n.64. 
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to actually considering each stakeholder.144 Even though “con-
sidering” stakeholders may allow directors to bypass interests 
completely,145 “consider” provides more clarity for directors to 
discharge their duties. “Consider” offers more clarity because it 
provides a bright-line formality for directors to follow. Directors 
can “check the box” for each stakeholder as opposed to the neb-
ulous “balancing” standard which may not truly create a bal-
ance. Benefit corporation directors should be required to “con-
sider” the impact to stakeholders because “balance” engenders 
much confusion as to the weight each stakeholder should re-
ceive. 
D. “ACCOMPLISH” THE PUBLIC BENEFIT PURPOSE VS. “PURSUE” 
THE PUBLIC BENEFIT PURPOSE 
Under the Model Act, directors must consider the ability of 
the benefit corporation to “accomplish” its public benefit pur-
pose.146 However, directors are required to consider the ability 
of the benefit corporation to “pursue” its public benefit purpose 
under the Minnesota Act.147 Although the courts have not yet 
interpreted any difference in the meaning between “accom-
plishing” or “pursuing” the public benefit purposes, “accom-
plish” seems to be a stronger verb on its face.148 When “pursu-
ing” a public benefit, directors may have the option to end the 
pursuit before the public benefit has been fully achieved, while 
“accomplishing” the public benefit may require the full 
achievement of the public benefit.  
Although the stronger language of “accomplish” should en-
courage directors to heed the corporate purpose when making 
decisions, it imposes too high of a standard on directors. Share-
holders can only bring an enforcement proceeding under the 
Model Act or Minnesota Act for failure of the directors to “pur-
sue or create” the public benefits.149 Although it is somewhat 
unclear what “pursue or create” means within the enforcement 
 
 144. Loewenstein, supra note 135, at 1026. 
 145. Id. at 1026–27. 
 146. See MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(a)(1)(vii). 
 147. See MINN. STAT. § 304A.201, subdiv. 1(1)(i) (2016). 
 148. “Accomplish” is a stronger word, as it is a verb meaning “to succeed in 
reaching” and “to bring to completion.” Accomplish, MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
(2016). The verb “pursue” is defined as “to find or employ measures to obtain” 
and “to engage in.” Pursue, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2016).  
 149. See MINN. STAT. § 304A.202, subdiv. 1(a) (2016); MODEL ACT, supra 
note 7, § 305(a)(1). 
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proceeding context, the standard of conduct for directors should 
be to “pursue or create” the public benefit purposes in order to 
be aligned with the claim that can be brought against the direc-
tors. 
E. TOO MANY INTERESTS FOR DIRECTORS TO CONSIDER 
WITHOUT ANY HIERARCHY OR PRIORITY 
Directors of benefit corporations must attract and serve 
shareholders while also having to serve the interest of multiple 
stakeholders, catering to various competing interests. Because 
there is no hierarchy nor prioritization of these interests in ex-
isting statutes, directors will likely disrupt the dual purpose of 
benefit corporations by only pursuing some interest and ne-
glecting others.150 Therefore, there needs to be a solution to bal-
ance the dual purposes. Difficult required consideration of the 
many stakeholders clamoring for director attention may be 
clarified by the potential for a priority of certain interests. 
1. Difference in Number and Variety of Stakeholders 
Within most benefit corporation statutes, there are six 
stakeholder groups to be considered when making corporate 
decisions. The numerous stakeholder interests are clamoring 
for attention. This may create a “fiduciary logjam” wherein di-
rectors are unable to choose on which factors to focus.151 This 
makes the director decision-making process more difficult and 
problematic.152 With the many factors that directors must con-
sider under the Model Act, directors have an “impossible task,” 
which may hinder their ability to make decisions and the quali-
ty of those decisions.153 Psychological research shows that when 
faced with many alternatives, people either continuously 
 
 150. In the event that there is a conflict between a social benefit and 
shareholder interest, it is likely the directors will support the shareholder in-
terest considering the current director standard of conduct is unclear and the 
shareholders vote for the directors. See Callison, supra note 117, at 109. Also, 
only the shareholders can bring a claim of action against the directors. MODEL 
ACT, supra note 7, § 305(b). Twenty-three state statutes follow the Model Act 
for this provision. Murray, supra note 114, at 1–2. 
 151. See Callison, supra note 23, at 153–54 (describing the social aspects of 
benefit corporation legislation as “illusory” when they conflict with private in-
terests). 
 152. See id.; Loewenstein, supra note 135, at 1011. 
 153. Loewenstein, supra note 135, at 1036; see also WEN, supra note 21, at 
86. (“[I]t is logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension at the 
same time.”). 
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choose the same one or two options,154 or avoid and defer the de-
cision because there are too many choices.155 Therefore, benefit 
corporation directors are likely to focus on one or two stake-
holders to the exclusion of others as a basis for decisions.156 Al-
ternatively, directors might defer decision-making and be 
forced to revisit the issue, thereby losing valuable opportuni-
ties.157 Also, “considering” an excessive number of stakeholders 
may have negative effects, because directors may not be able to 
process and compare the choices available to them.158 Overall, 
the large number of stakeholders that directors must consider 
when making corporate decisions may be overwhelming, which 
is likely to lead to poorer-quality decisions. 
While the Model Act and most benefit corporation statutes 
list six or more stakeholder interests that directors must con-
sider when making corporate decisions,159 some statutes list 
fewer stakeholders.160 For instance, both Hawaii and Minnesota 
require benefit corporation directors to focus on only two inter-
ests. In Hawaii, these two interests are: (1) the corporation’s 
ability to accomplish its specific public benefit; and (2) an ac-
tion’s effects on the shareholders.161 For Minnesota specific pub-
lic benefit corporations, directors must consider: (1) the share-
holders; and (2) the specific public benefit the corporation has 
listed in its articles of incorporation.162 With this more tailored 
focus, directors can presumably manage these two require-
 
 154. See John R. Hauser & Birger Wernerfelt, An Evaluation Cost Model of 
Consideration Sets, 16 J. CONSUMER RES. 393, 404–05 (1990). 
 155. Loewenstein, supra note 135, at 1030–31 (discussing the variety of 
techniques that directors may use to avoid making a final decision for what 
constituency is the most important to focus on, so the benefit corporation mod-
el may encourage the directors to shirk their duties). 
 156. Id. at 1033. 
 157. Id. at 1032. 
 158. Id. at 1033. 
 159. See MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(a). 
 160. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(a)(1) (2016); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 13.1-788(A)(1) (2016). Maryland omits the short and long-term interests of 
the benefit corporation and the ability of the benefit corporation to accomplish 
its general and specific public benefit purposes. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & 
ASS’NS §§ 5-6C-01 to 5-6C-08 (West 2016). This omission retracts a focus on 
the success of the benefit corporation’s goals itself. Johnson, supra note 12, at 
290. 
 161. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-6(a)(1) (2016). 
 162. Minnesota does not require the general public benefit in the specific 
benefit corporation. MINN. STAT. § 304A.201, subdiv. 2 (2016); Brett H. 
McDonnell, Committing to Doing Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary Duty in 
Benefit Corporations, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19, 42 (2014). 
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ments more effectively than they could manage the six or more 
stakeholder interests directors are provided in most other stat-
utes.163  
To illustrate the tailored focus of a specific public benefit 
corporation, consider the following example: a company focus-
ing on recycling and reusing products to decrease its environ-
mental impact plans to purchase refurbished machinery for 
creating products. When contemplating this purchase, a specif-
ic public benefit corporation director would be required to con-
sider only its specific objective of recycling and reusing prod-
ucts to decrease environmental impact and its effect on its 
shareholders. By contrast, the director of a general public bene-
fit corporation would have to consider all six of its stakeholders, 
with little guidance as to the amount of attention each stake-
holder deserves. This example demonstrates how directors of 
specific public benefit corporations are able to make more fo-
cused decisions, because they are not required to consider the 
impact of decisions on numerous extra stakeholders. Nonethe-
less, specific public benefit directors are still allowed to consid-
er other interests, but are not required to for every decision. 
2. Lack of Guidance for Priority of Stakeholder Interests 
Directors Must Consider 
Within benefit corporation legislation, there is no hierar-
chy to or prioritization of the stakeholder interests that direc-
tors must consider.164 The Model Act and most benefit corpora-
tion statutes allow directors to give only specific stakeholders a 
priority if the articles of incorporation have stated that there 
will be prioritization.165 Some states have not included the pos-
sibility for stakeholder prioritization language at all.166 Even 
the Model Act, which allows benefit corporations to select a 
specific public benefit, does not give priority to the specific pub-
lic benefit over the obligation to fulfill a general public bene-
fit.167 This may imply a rotation of interests, which can keep 
shareholder wealth maximization from being the focus, but it is 
 
 163. Limiting the number of interests that directors must consider im-
proves director focus to pursue company objectives and also keeps directors 
from being liable for failing to properly juggle six stakeholder interests. 
 164. Callison, supra note 23, at 149. 
 165. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, §§ 102, 201(a); see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 156E, § 10(b) (2016). 
 166. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-07 (West 2011). 
 167. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 201(b). 
  
1776 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1749 
 
not clear.168 However, it does not prevent one or two of the 
stakeholders from dominating the corporation’s activities so 
long as each stakeholder is occasionally a main focus.169 This 
could reduce the pursuit of the social purposes and disappoint 
the investor, consumer, or founder.170 
Without any established priority or weight of factors for di-
rectors to consider, it is unlikely courts will be able to support 
director accountability.171 No litigation has been reported thus 
far involving benefit corporations, likely due to the new nature 
of the entities, most of the entities being small, and most being 
closely held.172 Therefore, it is unclear how courts may react. 
However, courts may invoke the canon of statutory interpreta-
tion and decide that a specific purpose controls over a general 
purpose requirement.173 The top priority may be the specific 
benefit by default, so it would be helpful and practical to priori-
tize the specific public benefit. Requiring a priority of the spe-
cific public benefit may provide more guidance for effective di-
rector decision-making174 and may allow shareholders and 
courts more accountability for directors.175 Also, a required pri-
ority will help focus director decisions on the corporation’s spe-
cific public benefit purpose. Last, a priority will provide further 
transparency to the board’s decision making176 and can provide 
weightings for the costs and benefits of any decision.177 
In sum, there are five distinct ways that director duties 
under benefit corporation statutes can be clarified. These con-
sist of requiring: (1) a specific public benefit with an option to 
adopt the general public benefit instead of requiring only the 
vague general public benefit; (2) consideration of proposed, con-
 
 168. Walker, supra note 19, at 169. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Murray, supra note 17, at 365–66. However, it is possible that benefit 
corporation law may lead to norms that will deter directors from using social 
enterprises to further their own causes instead of the general interests of soci-
ety. Id. 
 172. Id. at 366 n.117. 
 173. Id. at 357. It is likely that the specific interests and specific benefits 
take precedent over the general interests and general benefits. Callison, supra 
note 23, at 159; see Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Calvin 
Tomkins Co., 322 U.S. 102, 107 (1944) (stating that specific terms in a statute 
control over general terms). 
 174. Murray, supra note 17, at 356; see also Murray, supra note 6, at 507. 
 175. Murray, supra note 115, at 33. 
 176. Lidstone, supra note 127, at 40. 
 177. Murray, supra note 115, at 29. 
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templated, and actual actions instead of infinite unknown ac-
tions; (3) directors to “consider” the impact to stakeholders for a 
bright-line standard as opposed to “balance” stakeholders with 
unclear weight; (4) directors to “pursue or create” benefit pur-
poses to align with enforcement proceeding requirements; and 
(5) a prioritized specific public benefit for a focused objective. 
These five clarifications will provide much-needed guidance for 
directors by decreasing the uncertainty surrounding their 
standard of conduct. 
III.  PROPOSED STATUTE TO INCREASE GUIDANCE AND 
CLARITY FOR STANDARD OF CONDUCT FOR DIRECTORS 
OF BENEFIT CORPORATIONS   
States can improve benefit corporation legislation by in-
cluding provisions that address the standard of conduct for di-
rectors.178 This Part proposes specific statutory language that 
will clarify benefit corporation standard of conduct within Sec-
tion A. Specifically, the statutory language clarifies the stand-
ard of conduct by imposing these three main components: 
(1) mandatory specific public benefit; (2) required priority of the 
specific public benefit; and (3) opt-in for the general public ben-
efit. Section B explains the policy considerations underlying the 
statutory provisions. Last, Section C addresses counterargu-
ments. By utilizing the proposed statute within this Note that 
addresses five main concerns with current legislation, states 
can provide clarity and guidance for standard of conduct for 
benefit corporation directors. 
A. PROPOSED STATUTE FOR BENEFIT CORPORATION STANDARD 
OF CONDUCT 
The model language below suggests the best standard of 
conduct for director duty to provide clarity and director guid-
ance based on the five main issues with the current benefit cor-
poration legislation. The main components of the proposed so-
 
 178. The B Lab organization, which drafted the first model language for 
benefit corporation legislation, lobbies states to enact only its Model Act and 
does not encourage deviation from the Model Act provisions. Callison, supra 
note 23, at 164. More states should consider alternative approaches to the 
Model Act in order to allow legislation to advance and find the most viable and 
useful alternative. Id. Corporate law should help promote and enhance the 
creation of the corporate value found within the new benefit corporation in-
stead of limiting its expansion. See First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 
No. 01-CVS-10075, 2001 WL 1885686, at *2 (Super. Ct. N.C. Aug. 10, 2001). 
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lution are: (1) mandatory specific public benefit; (2) required 
priority of the specific public benefit; and (3) optional general 
public benefit. The mandatory specific public benefit is accom-
plished through the language in subdivision 1(a)(1). The priori-
tization of the specific public benefit is accomplished through 
the language in subdivision 1(b). Finally, the provision allowing 
for the opt-in general public benefit is contained in the lan-
guage of subdivision 2. Overall, the proposed statute provides 
clarity by utilizing the most effective parts of the Model Act, 
Minnesota Act, Delaware Act, and Colorado Public Benefit 
Corporation Act, as well as the priority and opt-in provisions 
distinct from current benefit corporation legislation. 
Standard of conduct for directors. 
Subdivision 1. Consideration of interests for specific 
public benefit corporation.179 In discharging the duties of 
their respective positions and in considering the best interests 
of the benefit corporation, the board of directors, committees of 
the board, and individual directors of a specific public benefit 
corporation:180 
(a) shall consider181 the effects of any proposed, contem-
plated, or actual action182 on: 
(1) the ability of the benefit corporation to pursue or 
create183 its specific public benefit purpose as listed 
in the articles of incorporation;184 and 
(2) the pecuniary interests of its shareholders; 
 
 179. For a full discussion of why the specific public benefit provides more 
clarity and guidance for directors than the general public benefit, see supra 
Part II.A. 
 180. See MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(a). 
 181. See id. § 301(a)(1). For a discussion explaining why “consider” provides 
greater clarity and guidance for directors than “balance,” see supra Part II.C. 
 182. See MINN. STAT. § 304A.201 (2016). For a discussion about why “ac-
tion” provides greater clarity and guidance for directors than “action or inac-
tion,” see supra Part II.B. Also, the two stakeholders listed as required for 
consideration are similar to those required in the specific public benefit corpo-
ration in Minnesota: the specific public benefit and the shareholders. MINN. 
STAT. §§ 304A.001–304A.301 (2016). 
 183. See MINN. STAT. § 304A.201, subdiv. 1(1)(i) (2016). For a discussion 
about why “pursue or create” provides greater clarity and guidance for direc-
tors than “accomplish,” see supra Part II.D. 
 184. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-503(1)(a) (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 
§§ 362(a)(1), 365(a) (2016). For a discussion about why a required specific pub-
lic benefit provides greater clarity and guidance for directors, see supra Part 
II.A. 
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(b) shall give priority only to the benefit corporation’s 
ability to pursue its specific public benefit purpose;185 
and 
(c) may consider the effects of any proposed, contem-
plated, or actual action on:186 
(1) the employees and work force of the benefit cor-
poration, its subsidiaries, and its suppliers; 
(2) the interests of customers as beneficiaries of the 
specific public benefit or general public benefit pur-
poses of the benefit corporation; 
(3) community and societal factors, including those 
of each community in which offices or facilities of the 
benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, or its suppliers 
are located; 
(4) the local and global environment; 
(5) the short-term and long-term interests of the 
benefit corporation, including benefits that may ac-
crue to the benefit corporation from its long-term 
plans and the possibility that these interests may be 
best served by the continued independence of the 
benefit corporation; 
(6) the interests referred to in [cite constituencies 
provisions of the business corporation law if it refers 
to constituencies not listed above]; and 
(7) other pertinent factors or the interests of any 
other group that they deem appropriate which are 
listed in the articles of incorporation. 
 
Subdivision 2. Consideration of interests for general 
public benefit corporation. A corporation may choose to in-
clude a provision in its articles of incorporation which specifies 
that it shall consider the effects of any proposed, contemplated, 
or actual action on the interests of the stakeholders listed in 
subdivision 1(c). A corporation that adopts the required consid-
eration of the interests of the stakeholders listed in subdivision 
1(c) shall be named a general public benefit corporation.  
 
 185. For a discussion about why requiring a priority of the specific public 
benefit provides greater clarity and guidance for directors, see supra Part 
II.E.2. 
 186. To see where the first five proposed statute permissive stakeholders 
are listed within the Model Act’s seven mandatory stakeholders list, see MOD-
EL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(a)(1)(ii)–(v). For further discussion why these 
stakeholders are permissive instead of mandatory, see supra Part II.E. To see 
where the last two proposed permissive stakeholders are listed within the 
Model Act’s permissive stakeholders list, see MODEL ACT, supra note 7, 
§ 301(a)(2)(i)–(ii). 
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B. CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING PROPOSED STATUTORY 
REFORM 
1. Requirement of the Specific Public Benefit: Subdivision 
1(a)(1) 
First, the model language proposed here requires that the 
benefit corporation “shall consider . . . its specific public benefit 
purpose as listed in the articles” in subdivision 1(a)(1).187 The 
required specific public benefit provides more guidance for di-
rectors by reinforcing the support and interest in placing an 
emphasis on one cause, as opposed to the broad concept of pur-
suing a general public benefit which allows directors too much 
decision-making freedom.188 Allowing benefit corporations to 
pursue only a general public benefit as within the Model Act is 
too vague and does not provide a practical way for directors to 
make decisions.189 
The specific public benefit’s identifiable objective also al-
lows better director accountability, as shareholders can point to 
a more concrete goal and determine whether the directors have 
worked towards the corporate goal.190 With the limited standing 
to sue and limited claims of action, directors already have much 
flexibility that should not be expanded with the freedom of the 
general public benefit as well. Benefit corporations are favored 
by consumers and investors because of social consciousness,191 
so directors should be accountable for their actions to be social-
ly conscious. 
2. Priority of the Specific Public Benefit: Subdivision 1(b) 
Requiring a specific public benefit is the first step towards 
a focused vision and identifiable objective, but it is not suffi-
cient. Without a prioritization of interests, directors may not 
pursue the specific public benefit zealously. This can be espe-
cially problematic considering the likelihood the directors will 
seek to pursue shareholder interests at the neglect of stake-
 
 187. This is similar to the Delaware Act, which requires every benefit cor-
poration to create a specific public benefit. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 362(a) 
(2016).  
 188. Walker, supra note 19, at 169. For a full discussion of why the specific 
public benefit provides more clarity and guidance for directors than the gen-
eral public benefit, see supra Part II.A. 
 189. Murray, supra note 115, at 30. 
 190. See id. at 33. 
 191. See Benefits of Becoming a Sustainable Business, supra note 132. 
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holder interests. Therefore, the proposed priority provision is 
included in subdivision 1(b) and states that the directors “shall 
give priority only to the benefit corporation’s ability to pursue 
its specific public benefit purpose.” 
Prioritizing the specific public benefit is necessary to fully 
focus director attention towards the company objective.192 With 
guidance for director focus, directors will be less likely to dis-
proportionately attend to interests that detract from the specif-
ic public benefit. Therefore, the prioritization provision will 
help ensure that benefit corporations remain social enterprises 
focused on creating benefit for society. 
When making corporate decisions, directors may consider 
the multiple stakeholders listed in the proposed statute (or 
must consider the multiple stakeholders if the company opted-
in to the general public benefit), but would make the final deci-
sion based on the impact of the specific public benefit. For ex-
ample, a benefit corporation that operates a fitness gym may 
have a specific public benefit to help Americans become healthy 
through physical activity and raise awareness about the im-
portance of fitness. When determining a location to advertise 
for the company, the directors discuss placing new electronic 
advertisements in a neighborhood with a marsh that is not 
close to a public park nor other facilities where its residents can 
exercise. When contemplating the advertisement location, the 
directors may consider the disruption to the environment, the 
gym’s customers, the community that might not appreciate a 
brightly lit advertisement near the marsh, the company em-
ployees, shareholders, the company’s short-term and long-term 
interests, and the ability to pursue the benefit purposes. After 
considering the impacts on all of the stakeholders, the priority 
consideration would focus on pursuing the specific benefit pur-
pose of raising awareness about physical fitness and helping 
Americans become physically fit. With the prioritization provi-
sion, the directors have clearer guidance about what to do—
analyze each factor but keep the specific public benefit a priori-
ty. 
 
 192. Benefit corporations should rank or prioritize the specific benefit pur-
pose because it is a value the benefit corporation intends to create. See First 
Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., No. 01-CVS-10075, 2001 WL 1885686, at 
*3 (Super. Ct. N.C. Aug. 10, 2001). Ranking or prioritizing the specific benefit 
helps to harmonize the corporate system to function smoothly. See id. For a 
discussion about why requiring a priority of the specific public benefit provides 
greater clarity and guidance for directors, see supra Part II.E.2. 
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The primary thrust of the proposed statute is to encourage 
directors to thoughtfully analyze each consideration and be 
able to explain why they came to a conclusion, but allow them 
to make the final decision based on pursuing the specific public 
benefit. 
3. Opt-in to the General Public Benefit: Subdivision 2 
Within subdivision 1(c), specific public benefit corporation 
directors “may consider” the multiple stakeholders when mak-
ing corporate decisions; this creates a default of a permissive 
general public benefit. Within subdivision 2, general public 
benefit corporation directors “shall consider” the multiple 
stakeholders when making corporate decisions. While the de-
fault is a permissive general public benefit under subdivision 1, 
directors can opt-in to the required consideration of the multi-
ple stakeholders when making company decisions under subdi-
vision 2 by stating that requirement in the articles of incorpo-
ration. The opt-in for the required consideration of the multiple 
stakeholders forces the directors to affirmatively commit to 
that consideration. Creating the required consideration of the 
general public benefit as an opt-out may otherwise trap unwary 
benefit corporations because omission bias creates the tendency 
to favor inaction over action.193 
The requirement under the Model Act for the general bene-
fit corporation to consider the six mandatory stakeholders 
makes the decision-making process difficult and problematic.194 
Some benefit corporations might regard these requirements as 
so burdensome that fulfilling them hinders the company’s pur-
suit of its unique, specific public benefit. Therefore, strictly re-
quiring a general public benefit, as the Model Act and other 
state statutes do, does not represent the best policy. 
The proposed language fixes the above policy shortcoming 
by allowing benefit corporations to make the general public 
benefit optional. The proposed language does so by allowing the 
benefit corporation to opt-in to the required general public ben-
efit under subdivision 2. For example, a benefit corporation 
may have a specific benefit purpose of providing organic food to 
children around the country and raising awareness about 
healthy foods. The directors are creating an organic food deliv-
 
 193. For a discussion of the necessity of an optional general public benefit, 
see supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text. 
 194. See Loewenstein, supra note 135, at 1011. 
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ery route. With a required general public benefit, the directors 
would need to make many vague, additional considerations (i.e. 
environmental impact from truck emissions, employee conven-
ience of the routes and delivery time, etc.), which would compli-
cate the effectuation of their specific public benefit—delivering 
food. The opt-in provision helps prevent this dilemma, by allow-
ing the benefit corporation to simply focus on the unique, be-
nevolent purpose of delivering organic food to kids.195 
By making the requirement of the general public benefit 
optional, the proposed language could attract social entrepre-
neurs that would otherwise refrain from creating a benefit cor-
poration because of the overwhelming requirements of the gen-
eral public benefit. Because many benefit corporations already 
seek a general public benefit, however, the opt-in nature of the 
general public benefit in the proposed language creates a con-
venient option. 
C. A SPECIFIC PUBLIC BENEFIT IS SUPERIOR 
While the proposed statute effectively provides director 
clarity and guidance lacking in current benefit corporation leg-
islation, there are a few counterarguments against the provi-
sion. This Section will address these counterarguments and 
highlight their merit, but will ultimately show that the re-
quired and prioritized specific public benefit with an opt-in 
provision for the general public benefit best carries out the 
purposes behind the benefit corporation. 
1. Requiring a Specific Public Benefit 
While the above proposed statute requires a prioritized 
specific public benefit and allows for an opt-in general public 
benefit, there are reasons why a general public benefit should 
be required instead. Provided with the Model Act, there is a ra-
tionale for the provisions in the Model Act called “the White 
Paper.”196 The White Paper lists two reasons why the benefit 
corporation statutes should require the general public benefit 
instead of the creation of one or more specific public benefits.197 
First, the purpose of the new corporate entity was to create 
“benefit for society and the environment generally as well as 
 
 195. Providing the default as a specific public benefit corporation allows 
more freedom to focus on one objective. 
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 197. Id. at 21. 
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shareholders.”198 While a specific public benefit creates director 
clarity, corporations may not be interested in accomplishing the 
specific benefit for one part of society, but concurrently creating 
other problems for other parts of society like the environment 
or the community. The purpose behind the creation of the bene-
fit corporation was to create an entity that provided broad soci-
etal good. The ideal way to allow for this protection is requiring 
a general public benefit purpose. 
Second, the general public benefit avoids unintended con-
sequences. The general public benefit purpose prevents abuse 
of corporations from “greenwashing,” or the outward perception 
of social responsibility.199 Without the general public benefit 
purpose, a corporation could choose a specific public benefit 
purpose and then “consider” and dismiss all other stakeholders 
when making decisions.200 Therefore, benefit corporations may 
take advantage of the limited required considerations. This 
would undermine a main purpose of the benefit corporation leg-
islation: to create benefit for society generally.201 
However, the mandate that a benefit corporation pursue a 
“general public benefit purpose” is too vague, because it does 
not provide a practical way for directors to make decisions.202 
This vagueness can allow director abuse and self-dealing or ir-
responsible directors.203 Furthermore, a general public benefit 
corporation might have the ability to “greenwash” more than a 
specific public benefit corporation, because it is less clear what 
stakeholder is the focus of the decisions. While the general pub-
lic benefit may be too expansive, a benefit corporation can more 
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easily pursue a specific public benefit because directors can 
more easily identify the objective.204 A specific public benefit 
would also provide a more workable system of board accounta-
bility.205 
Nonetheless, research suggests that sixty-eight million 
United States consumers base their purchasing decisions on 
their sense of social and environmental values as a whole,206 so 
consumers may want corporations to consider a variety of 
stakeholders. For consumer, investor and entrepreneur de-
mand, it is important to allow the benefit corporations to in-
clude the general public benefit with the consideration of a va-
riety of stakeholders. Therefore, the proposed statute includes 
an opt-in of the general public benefit if corporations want the 
required consideration of multiple stakeholders. 
2. Flexibility and Judicial Development 
A required specific benefit and priority may create a loss of 
flexibility for the new entity form. Having too much detail cre-
ates rigid law and lacks flexibility to cope with and reflect con-
tinuing developments.207 If the duty provision is too narrow, 
there is a danger that directors will “merely comply with the 
letter of the law as opposed to its spirit.”208 On the other hand, a 
general public benefit provision encourages flexibility and ena-
bles innovation by simply setting a “directional” performance 
requirement of a material positive impact on society and the 
environment, without creating unnecessarily prescriptive per-
formance requirements like achieving zero waste or becoming 
carbon neutral.209 
However, the general public benefit with general duty 
terms may allow for excessive judicial development.210 As the 
general public benefit is vague and therefore unpredictable, it 
will force benefit corporations to rely on litigation to discern the 
duty’s meaning. Such a situation would be harmful because lit-
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igation is burdensome and expensive. Corporations are incon-
venienced by needing to wait until courts decide how to inter-
pret the law before the directors understand their duties. The 
lack of clarity within the vague concept of the general public 
benefit could give serial and aggressive litigants the opportuni-
ty to bring frivolous lawsuits against the company.211 This 
threat of vexatious litigation will dissuade social entrepreneurs 
from creating benefit corporations. Therefore, a required gen-
eral public benefit is misguided. 
3. Lack of Investors for Specific Public Benefit 
Generally, there is uncertainty with whether benefit corpo-
rations will be able to attract the same types of capital as tradi-
tional for-profit corporations.212 Critics are concerned that in-
vestors will continue to invest in traditional for-profit 
corporations because they are not willing to sacrifice a portion 
of their would-be profits for the greater social good, considering 
benefit corporations emphasize social responsibility rather than 
shareholder returns.213 
However, benefit corporations are an attractive option for 
investors who are interested in turning a profit but are also 
committed to investing in a company that focuses on social re-
sponsibility and the environment.214 The general idea is that 
these companies that “do good for society” will also tend to “do 
well in the market,” thus benefitting the state as a whole.215 Be-
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 212. See Doug Bend & Alex King, Why Consider a Benefit Corporation?, 
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cause this corporate form explicitly includes philanthropy as a 
component of the board of directors’ considerations, potential 
investors who seek only maximization of profits are less likely 
to invest in these types of ventures because their corporate 
goals diverge.216 
Investors in benefit corporations and other social enter-
prises are part of the socially responsible investing (SRI) 
movement, which has grown over the past thirty years to rep-
resent almost ten percent of the United States’ assets under 
management, or roughly $6.2 trillion dollars.217 According to the 
United States Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Invest-
ment, in the year 2014, socially responsible investors invested 
$4.85 trillion dollars.218 J.P. Morgan estimates the ten-year 
profit potential from these opportunities alone ranges between 
$183 billion and $667 billion dollars.219 Although the benefit 
corporation is a new entity, the success of a reputable company 
similar to Patagonia, which has doubled in size and tripled its 
profits since 2008,220 suggests that benefit corporations may be 
a good investment opportunity and will attract investors.221 
 
n.221 (2010) (explaining that empirical studies have revealed a positive corre-
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mance). Stock in “responsible” companies is effectively a “composite financial 
product[ ]—a bundle that blends an investment vehicle together with a chari-
table giving vehicle.” Joshua Graff Zivin & Arthur Small, A Modigliani-Miller 
Theory of Altruistic Corporate Social Responsibility, 5 TOPICS ECON. ANALYSIS 
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There may still be a concern about whether investors will 
invest in the type of benefit corporation suggested in this Note: 
prioritizing the specific public benefit, with an optional general 
public benefit. However, it is likely investors will still invest as 
much in these benefit corporations as the specific benefit corpo-
rations already created. By providing notice of the prioritized 
specific public benefit to investors, benefit corporations are in a 
better position to attract the types of investors who share their 
interests in philanthropic endeavors.222 With the many invest-
ments made in benefit corporations thus far,223 it is likely inves-
tors will also invest in the benefit corporations formed under 
the proposed statute. 
  CONCLUSION   
Fiduciary duties in benefit corporations ensure director ac-
countability through two approaches. One is to deter and sanc-
tion directors who do not accomplish their purpose within the 
benefit corporation, and the second is to guide directors who 
work steadfastly towards accomplishing their purpose with the 
help of standards and guidance.224 Directors can lead these cor-
porations to successfully fulfill the social good and positively 
impact the society. However, given the lack of guidance or clar-
ity of director duty within current statutes, directors may face 
moral challenges and difficult decisions when considering 
stakeholder interests. When lawsuits are brought against bene-
fit corporations, courts will provide guidance for best practices 
for directors over time. Nonetheless, clarity of director duties is 
needed now to provide guidance when interests conflict. Benefit 
corporations propose to “do good while still doing well”;225 clear 
guidance for directors can help corporations accomplish these 
dual purposes. 
Because the current benefit corporation statutes lack clear 
guidance for director duty, reform thus requires benefit corpo-
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rations to have a prioritized, specific public benefit with an op-
tional general public benefit. The proposed statute requires a 
specific public benefit purpose that places an emphasis on one 
identified cause. This mandate gives directors the ability to fo-
cus on their single, unique benefit without having to struggle to 
consider a list of vague stakeholder interests. This focus will 
help eliminate the lack of clarity that currently impedes direc-
tor decision-making in current benefit corporation legislation. 
The opt-in provision for the general public benefit allows social 
entrepreneurs to retain the “triple bottom line” as the main 
purpose behind their benefit corporation if they choose. In sum, 
the proposed statute provides directors with the confidence to 
make decisions while providing consumers and investors with 
the assurance that directors will be held accountable for corpo-
rate actions. 
